State of Utah v. Frank Madrid : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
State of Utah v. Frank Madrid : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Jennifer
Barton; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; Counsel for Appellee.
Catherine L. Begic; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Frank Madrid, No. 981404 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1971
Ui«n t APPEALS 
::UMENT 
K F U 
^10 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPF ALSQCKET NO. — ^ ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
FRANK MADRID, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
CaseNoj|||H1404-CA 
Priority 1 1 1 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR BURGlPWy, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, AND ATTEMPTED THEFT, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE R O l i l i , LIVINGSTON 
PRESIDING 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. FRED! 
Assistant 
JANGRi 
Utah Att< 
HeberW 
160 East 
Salt Lake 
84114-OJ 
JENNIFI 
Deputy S 
Attornej 
IHprVOROS, JR. (3340) 
ffl|jMpey General 
l |H[(1231) 
nUHpeneral 
MMftilding 
IIP South, 6th Floor 
llBiiUtah 
infill 
ik BARTON 
alt Lake District 
r 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel f« >r Appellee 
FILED 
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED O P I N I 0 1 » T RECDrtSESfflirBf AW*6*8 
JUN - * 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
FRANK MADRID, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981404-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, AND ATTEMPTED THEFT, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
PRESIDING 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0854 
JENNIFER BARTON 
Deputy Salt Lake District 
Attorney 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE 
JURY RETURN A VERDICT OF GUILTY, DEFENSE 
COUNSEL DID NOT PERFORM INEFFECTIVELY IN 
NOT MOVING TO DISMISS THE CHARGES OR TO 
ARREST JUDGMENT 7 
II. EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUPPORTED THE COURT'S 
CAREFULLY WORDED FLIGHT INSTRUCTION 17 
CONCLUSION 21 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Relevant statutes. 
Addendum B - Jury instruction no. 24 (as proposed and as given) 
i 
TABI.F OF AUTHORITIES 
SI A I I, LASLS 
Bale ) 19 
Butter/-U\ Ciol v'" M "»•' ^ 3 (T't* \ r r 10'- ) 7,8,10 
demons v. State, 424 N.E.2d i 13 (li_, , 19 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 N.E.2d 837 (Mass x™^ i ' 
Fisn^i . i / . . p r . , • . . .... ) 18 
Z « " • < • • " l • • ' i ' - 20 
People v. Exum, 208 A.D.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. :•.-.• ., i9 
State v. Abraham, 451 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. 199<x 1 
State v. flofes, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983) 18 
S • • •. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) 15 
State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993, ) 
State v. Carlson, 934 P 2d 657 (Utah App. 1997) 2 
State v ^l,..,l... , , . 21 
£ < • • 3 
State v. £///*, 748 P._d i88 (Utah 1987) 16 
State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah ? n o"x . 18 
State v. Gonzalez, J I ,' I' Jil .i I ' | . ^ .18 
ii 
State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1997), 
cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998) 8, 16 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992) 10 
State v. Hill, 727 P.2d221 (Utah 1986) 12, 13 
State v.Howland, 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988) 18 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) 18 
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987) 14, 15 
State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App. 1998) 9, 13 
State v. McCullar, 674 P.2d 117 (Utah 1983) 16 
State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 1994) 9 
State v Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993) 2 
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993) 7 
STATE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) 1, 2 
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101 (1995) 1,2, 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) 1, 2, 3, 10, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) 1, 2, 3, 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
• •• 
111 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: CaseNo.981404-CA 
vs. 
FRANK MADRID, 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION and NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary, a second degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1995), and attempted theft, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-4-101 (1995), in the Third District 
Court, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Where the evidence was sufficient for the jury return a verdict of guilty, did 
defense counsel perform ineffectively in not moving to dismiss the charges or to 
arrest judgment? 
"[W]here the ineffective assistance claim is raised for the first time on direct appeal, 
[this Court] must decide whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel as a matter of law." State v Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,466 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992)). Additionally, "appellate review 
of counsel's performance must be highly deferential; otherwise the 'distorting effects of 
hindsight' would produce too great a temptation for courts to second-guess trial counsel's 
performance on the basis of an inanimate record." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,466 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
2. Was evidence that a "panicky" defendant walked quickly away from the 
victim's apartment and drove off with the man who ran from the apartment when 
the victim interrupted a burglary in progress sufficient to support a flight 
instruction? 
"[T]he propriety of a jury instruction presents a question of law" and therefore, this 
Court reviews "such instructions for correctness." State v. Carlson, 934 P.2d 657, 659 
(Utah App. 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes relevant to this appeal are attached as addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1995); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1995); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1995); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1995). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 9 January 1998, defendant was charged by amended information with one count 
ofburglary, a second degree felony, in violation o I I h wi( MDL AN'^ " ] '') ''-J'U (llw " 
in ', ill. no ut I IIAM row-' ANN {$ 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 36-37). After a two-day trial, 
the jury found defendant guilty of burglary as charged and guilty of theft, a class A 
misdemeanor (R. 87-89). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 
years for tf le burglary conviction, with an additional Stti days mcarceu; 
npealed (R. 93). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On 24 November 1997, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Ray Paddock ("Paddock") 
arrived at his apartment.;. -> • I.JM I igli i, ii i Salt I ake City (R 110: 122) I 'addock 1 lad 
tvi niih I ntuvil mil i .i - agreement with Paul Reeves ("Reeves") for the basement 
apartment of the house, and was finishing remodeling work on the kitchen (R. 110: 122, 
148-49). Shortly after arriving, Paddock left the apartment to retrieve tools from 
locked the door to the apartment (R. * *v. *:;>. He noticed that there were no cars or 
anything "out of the ordinary" in front of the house when he left (R. 110: 125). The back 
'Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (I Jtah 1993). 
3 
chain-link gate was closed (R. 110: 126). Paddock was gone from the residence for no 
more than fifteen minutes (R. 110: 123-24, 140). 
When Paddock returned, a red Ford Escort was parked in his usual parking spot—on 
the road nearest the back door—and the gate was open (R. 110: 125, 127, 130). Thinking 
this was "kind of suspicious," Paddock walked to the back door of the house, where he 
"noticed that some people were coming — there was one guy jumping the fence out of my 
yard" (R. 110: 126). Paddock called out, "What are you doing in my yard," but the man 
ignored Paddock and began running straight to the red Escort (R. 110: 126, 128). 
As Paddock walked closer, he saw defendant walking on the sidewalk towards the 
red car (R. 110: 127). Paddock "asked him what he was doing in my yard, him and his 
friend or whatever" (R. 110: 127). Walking slowly backwards, defendant said that 
Paddock "was tripping," and that he wasn't in the yard; he claimed to be down at a van 
down the street (R. 110:127,143,146). Paddock, however, did not recall seeing any van 
down the street (R. 110: 127). Paddock noted that defendant was "pretty frantic" and 
"very panicky" (R. 110: 128). Moving at a "very fast walk," defendant reached the car 
and got into the driver's side while his unidentified companion entered the passenger side, 
and the two men drove away (R. 110:128,130). Paddock noted the license plate number 
(R. 110: 128). 
Paddock then proceeded to the back door of the house (R. 110: 128). He saw that 
a window was broken and the back door was open (R. 110: 128). Inside, Paddock found 
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five-speaker stereo system, which had been set up on a table in his downstairs 
apartment, had been moved to the top of the stairs as if it was "ready to be moved out of 
the house" (R. 110: 129. 139). Reeves'high-end stereo equipment was stuffed into a large 
gym bag in the kitchen (. Approximately i 
(iii i :li i :lii lgprii iter )beloi lgii lg t :> R etn es had also been moved from their proper locations 
and were "loaded up"and "ready to be packed out" (R. 110: 129, 14n, 14l>-51, 153-54). 
Paddock called the police (R. 110: 129). 
Detect ive James Nelson 
investigat ' j y ; . iNelson checked the license plate reported by 
Paddock and found that the license plate matched the vehicle description given (R. * * ~ 
159). Nelson also found that the red Ford Escort was registered to defendant, at 3128 
;> ; - ovei 1 ieard 1:1 le address (R 
i i u . u u j . The address was familiar to Paddock as it was located on the route Paddock 
took to work (R As such, Paddock later observed the same red Ford Escort 
in the dr iveway of defendant ' s residence, which is approximately two blocks from his 
apaiti in ml l II'"" I, III I ' "i I! I "' Hi i • '. ' 
Approximately - »„w — , Paddock "immediately" picked defendant 's 
photograph from a computer-generated photo array (R. 110: 136, 141, 161-64).2 
2
 Four months after the crime, Paddock attended a live line-up, where he picked a 
person other than defendant (R. 110: 142) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving to dismiss the 
burglary and attempted theft charges at the end of the State's case or after the jury verdict. 
The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts of guilty. The State's evidence 
showed that a burglary and attempted theft had been committed in the fifteen-minute time 
span Paddock was gone; that defendant was on site at this exact time; and that defendant's 
companion fled across Paddock's yard and jumped a chain-link gate. Furthermore, 
defendant parked close by the house near the back door where he would have access to 
the house. Finally, defendant was "panicky" when confronted and moved quickly to meet 
his co-perpetrator at the automobile. A motion to dismiss here could not have been 
granted; hence, counsel was not ineffective for not making it. 
2. The jury instruction on flight was supported by sufficient facts and therefore 
proper. Paddock saw defendant "quickly walking" to his car in a "panicky" manner while 
his unknown companion simultaneously "ran" to the defendant's car. The fact that 
defendant may have been "walking" does not preclude a flight instruction. 
Assuming arguendo the flight instruction was error, it was harmless. There was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without 
the flight instruction. Also, the instruction carefully instructed the jury that if found, 
evidence of flight could be probative. Finally, the instruction cautioned that legitimate 
reasons consistent with innocence may exist for an individual to flee a crime scene. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE JURY 
RETURN A VERDICT OF GUILTY, DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT 
PERFORM INEFFECTIVELY IN NOT MOVING TO DISMISS THE 
CHARGES OR TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not moving either to "dismiss the burglary and attempted theft charges when the state 
rested o r . . . to dismiss the conviction after the jury returned its guilty verdict" >n ihe 
m i i||1111 111 11 "l 111 • (M'ii)i 'iii •!> h'.M'1' ili ii,"- |n it i' .1 ilit i 11 11 ii c l i 'nu ' i il i n f i'itlii'1 i i 11 n r " I ' I ^ I ill 
at 9. . 
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 
make two showings. Defendant must show, first, "that his or her counsel rendered a 
"i{ " * • - i :• ;:! 1:1: itat M l I: • si :> 1 • a i in c b jectp ' e stai idai c:t of reasonable coi idi ict," at: i :1 
second, "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.'1 Tillman v. Cook, 855 
P.2d 211, 221 (Utah 1993) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
11le f,[f]ailure to prove either one of these prongs will defeat a claim of ineffective 
omitted). 
In order to show that trial counsel's performance fell below a reasonable objective 
standard, the "evidence must be sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgement." 
Butterfield, 817 P.2d at 336 (citation omitted). In other words, "[cjounsel must have been 
of such poor quality that the defendant was deprived of the 'counsel' guaranteed by the 
sixth amendment." Id. (citations omitted). However, "[a] mere showing that petitioner did 
not receive a favorable result or that his counsel's strategy did not work as planned does 
not establish that [] counsel was inadequate ... [and appellate courts] do not second guess 
the tactical strategy of trial counsel." Id. (citations omitted). 
In order to perform reasonably, counsel is not required to object to every error, only 
"readily apparent" ones: "the failure of counsel to object to an alleged error that is not 
readily apparent cannot constitute an objectively deficient performance." State v. Hall, 
946 P.2d 712, 720 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
To show prejudice, "[tjhere must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 
error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different." Butter field, 817 P.2d at 
336 (citation omitted). Meeting the prejudice standard is a "substantial task" and "[i]t is 
not enough to claim the alleged errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. 
at 336. Instead, "[t]he error must be such that [the appellate court will] lose confidence 
in the result on appeal." Id. When "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on 
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice... that course should be followed." Id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
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Here * *• longs merge: if it is "readily apparent" that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the verdict, counsel was deficient for not moving to dismiss and 
that deficient performance was necessarily prejudicial. On the other hand, if it was not 
"readily apparent" that the evidence was insufficient to suppoi t the * enJiel, umusePs 
question is whether it is "readily apparent" that the evidence presented in this case was 
insufficient to support a jury verdict of guilty. 
A motion to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence "requires the trial court to 
detei i t lii i. s , i: letl lei tt le defei 1 :la;t it i i: n ist proceed " " ail i tl: le ii iti: • :)(ii ictioi i of evidence ir= i 
defense." State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278,281 n.2 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Nor en, 
704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985)). "In order to submit a question to the jury, it is necessary 
that the prosecution present some evidence of every element needed to make out a cause 
ol .til »ii /in"" !l m|ili.t*>is atkioil) MOVSCM r tlii* evidence i M In \ W\\K\\ IN \\W h hi 
most favorable to the State" and if, when viewed in this light, "the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is 
required to submit the case to the jury for the determination of the guilt or innocence of 
t h e d e f • •• 
When a jiit\f verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, the appellate court 
"review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury [and an appellate court will] reverse a jury 
9 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Burk, 839 P.2d 880,884 (Utah App.), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Butterfield, 
817 P.2d at 337. Moreover, "[a]n appellate court viewing a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence does not reweigh the evidence and investigate witness credibility." Butterfield, 
817 P.2d at 337 (citation omitted). 
Consequently, here defendant's ineffective assistance claim succeeds only if it is 
readily apparent that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
was so lacking that a jury could not reasonably find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Defendant cannot meet this high standard. The State presented some evidence to 
support every element of the crimes charged. 
MA person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to commit a . . . theft." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
202(1) (1995). "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
6-404 (1995). "[A] person is guilty of attempt to commit a crime i f . . . he engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense." UTAH 
10 
CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1995). Finally, "[e]very person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1995). 
Thus, a motion to dismiss must fail if the State presented some evidence that 
defendant intentionally aided his co-perpetrator in entering Paddock's apartment and 
taking a substantial step toward removing another's property without authority. 
The evidence presented at trial meets and exceeds this standard. Paddock left his 
apartment locked and in good order; he returned in fifteen minutes to find defendant's car 
in his parking spot; his apartment broken into; two stereo systems, a computer system 
including printer, and approximately 100 CDs packed to move; and defendant's co-
perpetrator vaulting the fence. See pp. 3-5 herein. 
From these facts a jury could reasonably find that defendant's co-perpetrator entered 
Paddock's apartment and took a substantial step toward removing Paddock's property 
without authority, while defendant either helped in the apartment or stood lookout. 
Defendant's otherwise inexplicably "frantic," "panicky," and sarcastic behavior 
when reasonably questioned by Paddock; his refusal even to stop walking to converse; and 
his walking quickly to the car and driving his fleeing co-perpetrator away, see pp. 3-5 
herein, support a jury finding that defendant was a participant in the burglary and 
11 
attempted theft. These facts are not "as consistent with innocence as with guilt," as 
defendant claims. Br. Aplt. at 12. Defendant's explanation—that he "was conscious of 
the other man's guilt which prompted his panic and his quickened pace," Br. Aplt. at 
17—is implausible at best. It fails to explain why defendant would panic in response to 
the other man's guilt.3 
Moreover, defendant relies upon incorrect law. He cites State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221 
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that when only circumstantial evidence is presented, the 
"evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence." Br. Aplt at 13 (quoting Hill, 727 P.2d at 222). This misreads Hill Only two 
justices, the opinion's author and one other justice, concurred in the language quoted 
above. The dissent stated: "So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably 
be made, our inquiry stops." Id. at 224 (Hall, C.J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). One justice joined the dissent in totof and a third justice 
joined the dissent on the sufficiency issue, but voted to reverse "on an entirely different 
ground." Id. at 223 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in result). Consequently, a majority of 
the court rejected the "reasonable hypothesis of innocence" language upon which 
defendant relies. 
3
 Defendant did not testify. 
12 
Moreover, this Court recently held that ,f[t]he existence of one or more alternate 
reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding the 
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281 (citing State v. 
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,695 (Utah App. 1995)). It expressly rejected Lyman's assertion 
that the State bears a burden "to disprove every possible reasonable alternative 
hypothesis." Id. at 282 n.4. Instead, the court must "simply 'insure that there is sufficient 
competent evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime.'" Id. at 282 (quoting Blubaugh, 
904 P.2d at 695). 
Properly understood, Hill supports the State. In Hill, the defendant and his son had 
traveled to Utah to see relatives. Hill, 727 P.2d at 222. While visiting, Hill and his son 
visited a local antique shop and showed interest in several of the shop's items. Id. Hill 
signed the store's register book and included both his name and address. Id. Hill then left 
the store without making a purchase. Id. When the store owner opened the next morning, 
she found that several items had been stolen overnight, including some of the items Hill 
had shown interest in. Id. Hill and his son had meanwhile returned to their out-of-state 
homes. Id. Several days later, one of the stolen items was found in Hill's van. Id. Hill and 
his son were subsequently arrested with burglary and theft, and found guilty by a jury. Id. 
During the trial, a transcript of a taped interview was read into evidence that a third party, 
13 
a man by the name of Dave Hall, had confessed to the burglary, and had taken some of the 
chairs to the Hill residence. Id. 
Two justices (including the author of the lead opinion) concluded that "the evidence, 
taken as a whole, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew 
or had reason to believe the chairs were in fact stolen.,f Id. at 223. However, two 
dissenting justices concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Hill's conviction. 
Id. at 224 (Hall, C.J., dissenting). The fifth justice voted to reverse Mon an entirely 
different ground," but agreed with the dissent "that the evidence here, although marginal, 
is legally sufficient to support defendant's convictions." Id. at 223 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in result). Thus, a majority of the court found the evidence sufficient to 
convict Hill. 
Defendant here was tied more closely to the crime than was Hill. Defendant was 
at the crime scene when Paddock interrupted the burglary—in fact, his car was parked in 
Paddock's spot. Upon approaching the house, Paddock also "noticed that some people 
were coming" (R. 110:126, emphasis added): defendant (presumably the lookout) and his 
friend who vaulted the fence. After acting in a suspicious manner, defendant drove off 
with his friend. See pp. 3-5 herein. 
Defendant also compares the evidence in this case to that in State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 
60 (Utah 1987). Br. Aplt. 14-16. In Kalisz, the defendant and a companion returned an 
automobile to a used car lot within minutes after a robbery had been reported describing 
14 
the used car the men had been driving. Id. at 61. Kalisz admitted that he and his 
companion had driven around for a couple of hours, and had also claimed to take his 
companion to the local hospital because of an attack of appendicitis, which later was 
found to be untrue. Id. Kalisz was arrested and searched, but no incriminating evidence 
was found. Id. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Kalisz jury conviction, finding that 
the State "failed to present any evidence that placed Kalisz at the scene of the robbery or 
in the getaway car or linked him to the crime through possession any of the stolen goods." 
Id. The Court continued that, in this case, "[t]he circumstantial evidence connecting 
Kalisz to [his companion] and the crime is insufficient to prove that Kalisz was with [his 
companion] during or immediately after the robbery and that he had the requisite mental 
state for the crime with which he was charged." Id. 
Again, the instant case presents stronger facts. The evidence placed defendant at 
the scene of the burglary in progress and in the getaway car. He was also linked to the 
crime, not through possession of stolen goods—the burglary was aborted—but because 
Paddock saw him there and because he left hurriedly with his unidentified co-perpetrator. 
Utah courts have regularly found sufficient evidence to uphold jury verdicts in cases 
similar to the one at bar. In State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984), the defendant was 
convicted of burglary and theft. Id. at 44. The State presented evidence that a neighbor 
had spotted the defendant "hurrying down the driveway" of the house across the street 
carrying a camera. Id. The neighbor watched the man walk down the driveway and 
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eventually enter a car parked on the opposite side of the street. The neighbor called out 
the licence plate number to his wife. The neighbor also noticed nervousness in the 
unknown man. Id. A few days later, the neighbor successfully picked Bingham from a 
photo array. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the conviction and found that the record 
"contained] sufficient evidence to identify Bingham as the burglar." Id. at 46. The Court 
reasoned that the "circumstances of Bingham's leaving the scene of the burglary with a 
camera at about the time of the burglary obviously permits the inference that he was the 
burglar." Id. See also State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1987) (finding sufficient 
evidence although defendants not actually seen in burglarized home but their vehicle was 
seen driving past scene of crime, defendants later found asleep in vehicle near scene, and 
defendants gave conflicting testimony as to how long they had been in car); State v. 
McCullar, 674 P.2d 117, 118 (Utah 1983) (finding that even though victims could not 
testify with certainty that defendant was one of the men who robbed them, "the whole of 
the evidence supported] the jury's verdict"). 
Here it was, at the very least, not "readily apparent" that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a jury verdict. Hall, 946 P.2d at 720. Consequently, that defense 
counsel did not move to dismiss the case on that ground was neither deficient nor 
prejudicial. 
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POINT II 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUPPORTED THE COURT'S CAREFULLY 
WORDED FLIGHT INSTRUCTION 
Defendant claims that "there was not sufficient evidence of flight to justify the 
instruction" on flight given by the trial court. Br. Aplt. at 21. 
Proceedings below. The instruction was carefully drafted. The State proposed a 
flight instruction, to which defendant "vociferously" objected (R. 110: 176). The court 
noted the objection, ruled that "the instruction accurately states the law," and made two 
interlineations (R. 110: 215). Here is instruction No. 24 as given to the jury, showing the 
court's emendations: 
The flight Flight or attempted flight if any has been shown, of a person 
immediately after a crime has been committed, or after that person has been 
accused of a crime, is not enough alone to support a guilty verdict. However, 
you may certainly consider flight along with all of the other evidence during 
your deliberations. 
Keep in mind that there may be legitimate reasons for a person to flee 
that are completely consistent with innocence. A person may flee because he 
or she feels guilty, but that feeling of guilt may stem from something other 
than the crime with which he or she has been charged. The jury must decide 
whether a person's flight constitutes evidence that the person committed the 
crime charged. 
(R. 49, 80, addendum B). 
The court found that "the testimony by the eyewitness of the conduct of the 
defendant could reasonably be construed to be a flight and that there is certainly evidence 
from which a jury could find that that conduct constituted flight" (R. 215). The court 
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further noted that flight was merely "one consideration or factor that can be considered 
in determining guilt or innocence'1 (R. 110: 215). 
Controlling law. M[E]vidence of flight is probative." State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 
34, 39 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P.2d 1077 (1951); State 
v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933)). Flight instructions have long been 
approved when they are supported by evidence giving rise to a legitimate inference of 
"consciousness of guilt." See id.; State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 574-75 (Utah 1983); State 
v. Gonzalez, 517 P.2d 547, 548 (Utah 1973); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 
1991); State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580-81 (Utah App. 1988); Fisher v. Trapp 748 
P.2d 204,206-07 (Utah App. 1988). However, a flight instruction "will not be completely 
free from criticism unless it advises the jury that there may be reasons for flight fully 
consistent with innocence." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. 
Analysis. Defendant contends that giving the instruction was error because "there 
was insufficient evidence to support the instruction." Br. Aplt. at 20. He argues that he 
merely "walked quickly," and that this was an innocent response to the Paddock's 
questioning. Br. Aplt. at 22-23. Defendant also notes that Paddock asked defendant what 
he was doing in the yard (R. 110: 127) and that "such an odd question would have 
certainly alerted [defendant] to some sort of guilt and prompted his quickened pace toward 
his car." Br. Aplt. at 24. Finally, defendant argues that "[njothing suggests Madrid was 
an accomplice to the burglary, or even knew that such was going on when he and the other 
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person got into the red car together and drove off1 and Meven if Madrid realized at some 
point that the other man had burgled the home." Aplt. Br. at 25. 
These arguments are unpersuasive. First, not only did Paddock observe the 
"panicky" defendant walking quickly to the car, but Paddock simultaneously viewed 
defendant's co-perpetrator "running" to defendant's car (R. 110: 126, 128, 130). Thus, 
both suspects were simultaneously retreating rapidly from the house to defendant's car. 
Second, the mere fact that defendant may have been "walking quickly" as opposed 
to "running" is not dispositive. See, e.g., Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 760-61 (Wyo. 
1995) (finding no error in giving flight instruction where defendant merely "left" scene 
of crime); State v. Abraham, 451 S.E.2d 131, 156-57 (N.C. 1994) (finding evidence 
supported flight where police officer saw both defendants walking away from murder 
scene shortly after crime occurred); People v. Exum, 208 A.D.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1994) (finding flight charge appropriate even though defendant walked, rather than ran, 
away from police); demons v. State, 424 N.E.2d 113, 118-19 (Ind. 1981) (finding flight 
instruction justified although defendants stated they merely "continued walking home"). 
Third, there was nothing in Paddock's question that would alert an innocent person 
to "some sort of guilt." In fact, defendant responded sarcastically and defensively when 
Paddock "asked him what he was doing in my yard, him and his friend or whatever" (R. 
110: 127). Defendant said that Paddock was "tripping," that he "wasn't in his yard" (R. 
110: 127). Defendant's "friend was running to the car," while defendant, "very panicky," 
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retreated at a "very fast walk" (R. 110:127). Denying the trespass, accusing the 
homeowner of "tripping,"4 walking quickly away to join his fleeing companion, then 
driving him from the scene is conduct from which a reasonable fact-finder could infer 
defendant's consciousness of guilt for the charged crime. 
Fourth, the jury instruction, as required by law, cautioned the jury that flight may 
be consistent with innocence {see R. 80). 
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the flight instruction was unsupported by the 
evidence, it was harmless. As discussed in Point I above, there was sufficient evidence 
aside from flight for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
addition, the prosecutor did not argue flight to the jury {see R. 110: 199-205; 210-12). 
Moreover, the trial court "prejudice-proofed" the instruction. Because defendant's 
flight was controverted, the court crafted the instruction to allow for the possibility that 
the jury would find no flight: the jury was permitted to infer guilt from flight or attempted 
flight only "if any has been shown" (R. 80). This amendment eliminated any possibility 
of prejudice even if the evidence was insufficient to support an unqualified flight 
instruction. See, e.g., Leverettv. State, 333 S.E.2d609,610 (Ga. 1985) (finding that flight 
instruction was appropriate because the "charge did not intimate to the jury that flight had 
been proven but left it to the jury to determine whether there was flight, and, if so, what 
4
 Apparently a reference to a drug-induced "trip." 
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inference might be drawn therefrom11); Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 N.E.2d 837, 839 
(Mass. 1993) (finding that although flight instruction was not warranted by evidence, 
instruction was not prejudicial in light of entire instruction admonishing jury that it could 
only rely on such evidence if it found that it existed); Abraham, 451 S.E.2d at 157 (finding 
court did not express opinion on flight issue where instruction left it up to jury to decide 
whether totality of facts supported flight); State v. Cooke, 479 A.2d 727, 733 (R.I. 1984) 
(finding no prejudice where flight instruction allowed jury to find flight and accord it 
relevant weight). 
Because there was sufficient evidence of flight, the trial court did not err in giving 
the flight instruction. Furthermore, the carefully crafted instruction did not in any event 
prejudice the defendant, because it left the factual determination of flight up to the jury, 
informed the jury that flight was merely one consideration, and cautioned that flight may 
stem from reasons other than guilt of the charged crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commis-
sion of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt 
to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he 
engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a 
substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the 
actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually commit-
ted; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense 
could have been committed had the attendant circum-
stances been as the actor believed them to be. 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unautho-
rized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
Addendum B 
a w ' INSTRUCTION NO. O \ tY / \ J 
ight or attempted flight/1 of a person immediately after a crime has been 
committed, or after that person has been accused of a crime, is not enough alone to 
support a guilty verdict. However, you may certainly consider flight along with all of the 
other evidence during your deliberations. 
Keep in mind that there may be legitimate reasons for a person to flee that are 
completely consistent with innocence. A person may flee because he or she feels guilty, 
but that feeling of guilt may stem from something other than the crime with which he or 
she has been charged. The jury must decide whether a person's flight constitutes evidence 
that the person committed the crime charged. 
INSTRUCTION N O . ^ V 
Flight or attempted flight, if any has been shown, of a person immediately after a 
crime has been committed, or after that person has been accused of a crime, is not enough 
alone to support a guilty verdict. However, you may certainly consider flight along with all 
of the other evidence during your deliberations. 
Keep in mind that there may be legitimate reasons for a person to flee that are 
completely consistent with innocence. A person may flee because he or she feels guilty, but 
that feeling of guilt may stem from something other than the crime with which he or she has 
been charged. The jury must decide whether a person's flight constitutes evidence that the 
person committed the crime charged. 
